TOKYO - The Japanese Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry presented a goal at a nuclear power subcommittee meeting in June to build between two and five reactors by the 2040s and between 11 and 14 reactors by the 2050s at sites where nuclear power plants are set to be scrapped.
The move marked the first time numerical targets had been laid out since the government shifted its stance to allow the construction of new reactors under the 2023 Basic Policy for the Realization of Green Transformation, known as GX.
The figure of 14 reactors is in line with the government's 2010 Third Strategic Energy Plan, which was retracted in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster that occurred the following year. It is a matter of public knowledge that, since then, discussions took place nationwide on whether Japan should end its reliance on nuclear power.
Although the deadline has been pushed back from 2030 to the 2050s, I wonder what the reason is behind the necessity of 14 reactors. Has there really been such a major change in circumstances over the past 15 years that it outweighs the lessons of the Fukushima nuclear crisis?
The subcommittee materials cited an "expected increase in electricity demand" and the "growing importance of energy security" as environmental changes that necessitate operating that many reactors.
If so, Japan should be introducing large volumes of domestically sourced renewable energy, but since the GX strategy, measures to promote renewables have retreated significantly. While renewables face siting constraints, there is ample space for solar on rooftops, walls and abandoned farmland, and for offshore wind, making the challenges solvable.
The GX strategy also places heavy expectations on decarbonized fuels such as hydrogen, which will basically be imported, contradicting the "environmental changes" cited by the government regarding reliance on other countries.
Moreover, the cost of building new reactors has surged to more than 1 trillion yen ($6 billion) per unit, and even countries promoting nuclear power such as Britain have not seen much progress.
This is precisely why the subcommittee materials emphasize the need to improve the "business environment," which in effect means government support for construction, including consideration of the use of fiscal loans and a rate system that would allow cost recovery from the construction period.
Nuclear power is that expensive and risky, and if the government provides excessive support, the costs are likely to be passed on to consumers.
The feed-in tariff system for renewables, often criticized by nuclear power proponents, is nearing the end of its role after helping drive down solar purchase prices to nearly one-quarter over 15 years, yet support for nuclear power has -- 60 years after commercial operations began -- come to require even more generous measures.
In short, the government appears to be trying to keep both nuclear and thermal power in place despite the liberalization of the electricity market, but the rationale for such extensive support is not reasonable. This appears to be less about energy policy than about sustaining related operators and manufacturers.
In Germany, Spain and Britain, renewables already account for more than half of the power mix. The International Energy Agency's decarbonization scenarios project renewables will exceed 80 percent of the global power mix by 2040.
Because Japan is poor in fossil fuels and has experienced the Fukushima nuclear accident, it should not settle for the current government target of around 40 to 50 percent in fiscal 2040 but should prioritize expanding renewables by moving ahead of other countries to harness abundant domestic resources.
Hiroshi Takahashi, born in Hyogo Prefecture in 1969, is a professor at Hosei University. After working for Sony Group Corp., he served at the Cabinet Secretariat and as a professor at Tsuru University, before assuming his current post in April 2023. He has authored books on such topics as energy transition and Japan's Nuclear Regulation Authority.
